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Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis
for Complex Cyber-Physical Systems
Martin “Trae” Span
Logan O. Mailloux
Michael R. Grimaila

ABSTRACT

I

n the modern military’s highly interconnected and technology-reliant operational
environment, cybersecurity is rapidly growing in importance. Moreover, as a
number of highly publicized attacks have occurred against complex cyberphysical systems such as automobiles and airplanes, cybersecurity is no longer
limited to traditional computer systems and IT networks. While architectural analysis
approaches are critical to improving cybersecurity, these approaches are often poorly
understood and applied in ad hoc fashion. This work addresses these gaps by answering the questions: 1. “What is cybersecurity architectural analysis?” and 2. “How can
architectural analysis be used to more effectively support cybersecurity decision making
for complex cyber-physical systems?” First, a readily understandable description of
key architectural concepts and definitions is provided which culminates in a working
definition of “cybersecurity architectural analysis,” since none is available in the literature. Next, we survey several architectural analysis approaches to provide the reader
with an understanding of the various approaches being used across government and
industry. Based on our proposed definition, the previously introduced key concepts,
and our survey results, we establish desirable characteristics for evaluating cybersecurity architectural analysis approaches. Lastly, each of the surveyed approaches
is assessed against the characteristics and areas of future work are identified.
Keywords—cybersecurity; architectural analysis; system architecture; systems
security engineering; complex system security
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I. INTRODUCTION

MARTIN “TRAE” SPAN III is an Instructor of
Systems Engineering at the United States Air
Force Academy (USAFA), Colorado Springs, Colorado. He is commissioned as Captain in the
United States Air Force (USAF). He received his
undergraduate degree in Systems Engineering in
2012 from USAFA and is a recent distinguished
graduate from the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) with a Master of Science in Systems Engineering. He serves as a developmental
engineer and holds Department of Defense certifications in systems engineering, science and
technology management, test & evaluation, and
program management. He has served the USAF
as a developmental test engineer responsible
for planning and executing complex weapon
system test and evaluation. He is a member of
IEEE and the Tau Beta Pi Honor Society. Capt.
Span’s research interests include systems engineering and systems security engineering. He
can be contacted at: martin.span.1@us.af.mil

|

116 THE CYBER DEFENSE REVIEW

The cybersecurity threat is one of the most serious economic and national challenges we face as a
nation—economic prosperity in the 21st century
depends on cyber [1]. Cyberattacks have grown in
frequency and complexity, and it is now commonplace to hear of widespread cyberattacks on personal computers, webservers, and even large company and government personnel databases [2]. Moreover, as the Internet of Things (IoT) continues to
grow, the centrality of cyber-physical devices to
modern life is increasingly important [3]. Previously,
cyber-physical systems such as automobiles and
airplanes were relatively simplistic. Astonishingly,
the 2017 Ford F-150, a relatively common vehicle, has over 150 million lines of code [4], demonstrating the complexity of modern systems when
software is at the core of functionality [3]. For
these cyber-enabled systems, adversaries are
challenging traditional assumptions that systems
are secure due to their relative isolation and uniqueness. Recent examples include a widely-publicized
hacking demonstration against a Jeep Cherokee [6].
claims of hacking a commercial airliner [7], and
comprehensive reports of vehicle vulnerabilities [3].
In light of this growing threat, it is critical to analyze modern weapon systems for cybersecurity vulnerabilities as directed by the United States
Congress to mobilize industry to counter these
attacks [9].
Recent Department of Defense (DoD) policy updates have expanded the traditional IT security approaches and mandated cybersecurity assessments
for cyber-enabled weapon systems [9], [10], [11], [12].
These revisions dictate that acquisition programs
integrate cybersecurity efforts into existing systems engineering processes, and work to ensure
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cyber considerations hold equal footing with other
requirements and design trade-offs at major acquisition milestones [13].
For highly complex systems, including DoD weapon systems, architectural analysis is a critical enabler to effective cybersecurity; however, architectural analysis approaches are often poorly understood and applied in ad hoc fashion. This work addresses these gaps by answering the questions:
1. “What is cybersecurity architectural analysis?”
2. “How can architectural analysis be used to more
effectively support cybersecurity decision making for cyber-physical systems?”
LOGAN O. MAILLOUX (BS 2002, MS 2008, Ph.D.
2015) is an Assistant Professor at the Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT), Wright-Patterson
AFB, Ohio USA. He is commissioned as Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Air Force
(USAF) and serves as a computer developmental
engineer. He is a Certified Information System
Security Professional (CISSP), Certified Systems
Engineering Professional (CSEP), and holds Department of Defense certifications in cyberspace operations, systems engineering science
and technology management, T&E, and program
management. He is a member of IEEE, INCOSE, and ITEA professional societies, as well
as, HKN and TBP honor societies. He has served
the USAF as a cyberspace operations expert responsible network defense exercises, documenting and training computer security best practices and performing T&E of enterprise resource
planning solutions. Lt Col Mailloux's research
interests include systems security engineering,
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can be contacted at: Logan.Mailloux@us.af.mil

This paper examines and proposes answers to the
above questions. In Section II, we provide a readily
understandable discussion of key concepts and definitions. Section III expands on this foundation and
surveys several cybersecurity architecture analysis approaches from government and industry. In
Section IV, desirable characteristics for architectural analysis for cybersecurity are identified and
mapped to the approaches from Section III. Lastly,
Section V summarizes key findings and identifies
promising follow-on research areas for increasing
the effectiveness of cybersecurity architectural
analysis of unprecedented systems, specifically
modern complex cyber physical systems.
II. FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS
This section provides a brief historical context
for system-level architectural analysis and, more
formally, discusses key definitions for cybersecurity
architectural analysis.
A. Brief History of System Architecture
Much of the seminal work in the field of architecture analysis was accomplished by Zachman, who
proposed the first system architecture—a logical
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construct for integrating the complexities of modern information systems [14]. Similarly to the varying
levels of abstraction in physical construction plans,
Zachman argued that system architectures should
be composed of many perspectives in varying levels
of detail. Moreover, he insisted that these perspectives (or views) be synchronized across the system,
forming one integrated architecture.
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1993, MS 1995, PhD 1999) is Professor and
Head of the Systems Engineering and Management department at the Air Force Institute
of Technology (AFIT), Wright-Patterson AFB,
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network management, and systems engineering.
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Sowa expanded Zachman’s work to form the Information Systems Architecture (ISA) framework [15].
Shown in Fig. 1, the ISA employs six interrogatives
(what, how, where, who, when, and why) across five
levels of detail (scope, business, system, technology,
and detailed representations) as a means of expressing relationships to guide complex system
development [16]. In this way, the ISA offers a simplified approach to compare and elaborate on the desired capabilities, requirements, components, and
functions in an integrated enterprise-level model
which enables effective decision making. Note, not
all 30 conceptual graphs are required; thus, the
ISA is also tailorable. Since its inception, the ISA
(commonly known as the Zachman Framework) has
been a popular choice for system architects—it has
been widely used by system architects for decades,
while several other system-level frameworks have
incorporated or adopted its tenets [17].
B. Key Definitions
Here we discuss definitions for key terminology
used in this work (i.e., “cybersecurity,” “architecture,” and “analysis”). First, the term “cybersecurity”
should be addressed because it is generally the most
poorly understood (see sidebar in [16]). Within the
DoD, cybersecurity is formally defined as:
The prevention of damage to, protection of, and
restoration of electronic systems to ensure its
availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation [19].
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Figure 1. The Zachman Framework for Enterprise Architecture [24].
Despite being often cited, this definition tends to cause confusion because it is packed
with domain-specific IT jargon: availability ensures the system is usable as anticipated;
integrity is the protection from unauthorized modification; confidentiality is keeping
data private; authentication is a validation of the claimed identity; and, nonrepudiation is
the ability to prove that an action has taken place. While seemingly comprehensive, the
DoD definition is somewhat hindered with legacy terminology; a more practical (i.e., a
working) definition of cybersecurity might simply seek to protect critical systems against
cyber-based threats [20].
The next key term to define is “architecture” (note, we interpret “architecture” synonymously with “system architecture” and/or “system-level architecture”). Perhaps the most
classically understood definition of architecture is provided by Maier and Rechtin:
Structure in terms of components, connections, and constraints of a product, process,
or element [21].
This definition offers a holistic view of the system of interest to include technological
aspects as well as non-technological aspects, such as processes. In the simplest terms, an
architecture merely provides a means for viewing the system of interest from different
perspectives. Conversely, in a somewhat physically-driven characterization, ISO/IEC/IEEE
42010 provides the following definition for architecture:
The fundamental organization of a system, embodied in its components, their relationship to each other and the environment, and the principles governing its design and
evolution [22].
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Somewhat surprisingly, the DoD provides a progressive definition of system architecture:
A set of abstractions (or models) that simplify and communicate complex structures,
processes, rules, and constraints to improve understanding and implementation [23].
In addition to being readily understandable, this definition alerts the reader to the intrinsic value offered by such architectures in that they serve to simplify communication
with, and improve understanding of, key stakeholders (not just engineers). Moreover, this
definition implies that architectures are intended to improve the system’s implementation.
While these value-rich aspects of the definition are a bit atypical, they are useful for helping others to understand what an architecture is and does.
Lastly, the task of identifying a formal definition of “analysis” within the context of
a “system architecture” proved more difficult than previous definitions. Often a systems
architecture will center on an integrated model of entities and the relationships between
them; architectural models serve as a vehicle to bring order, and thus understandability,
to the growing complexity associated with complex systems. An architecture-focused definition may read as such:
Architectural analysis is the activity of discovering important system properties using
conceptual and physical models of the system of interest [25].
However, an architecture’s purpose is to increase understanding and facilitate better
engineering choice [17]. This two-fold purpose is acutely stated by Crawley et al.:
Architectural analysis focuses on understanding both the architecture’s function and
form to support decision making [26].
It is worth noting the closely related concept of architecture trade-off analysis, which
focuses on evaluating and comparing alternative architecture-level designs and attributes
(e.g., modifiability, security, performance, reliability, etc. [27].
C. Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis Working Definition
Ultimately, architectural analysis identifies trade-off points among system attributes
and facilitates communication among stakeholders (e.g., customers, developers, operators,
maintainers). System-level architectural analysis requires consideration of various missions, essential functions, potential components, and desirable attributes, which help to
clarify and refine stakeholder needs and, later, requirements. Moreover, integrated architectural analysis provides a robust framework for ongoing and concurrent system design
and analysis.
Specific to the cyber domain, architectural analysis should be used to understand cyber dependencies within the functions and form of the system to enable well-informed
decisions. This type of structured analysis brings an otherwise unmanageable amount of
information under control in support of system security requirements [28]. Architectural
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analysis enables system-level programmatic risk management by providing context and
functional mapping to the various physical elements of the system. Thus, cybersecurity
architectural analysis allows appropriate security mitigations to be applied where needed
with rigorous justification.
After considering seminal definitions in the area, and working through the various
architectural analysis approaches discussed in Section III, we present a working definition
of cybersecurity architectural analysis for consideration:
The activity of discovering and evaluating the function and form of a system to
facilitate cybersecurity decisions. [31]
This definition identifies two key activities, discovery and evaluation, while simultaneously catering to both new development (i.e., a focus on desired capability through functionality) and legacy systems (i.e., a focus on existing system solutions). For new developments, discovery typically implies exploring the business or mission problem space to
further understand the desired capability through functional analysis. For existing systems, this process is often conducted in reverse, mapping critical subsystems back to critical functions which support important business operations or mission execution. It is also
worth noting that cybersecurity architectural analysis should also help with identifying
and understanding how security requirements support the desired capability, which also
provides traceability that is often lacking in systems security efforts.
As part of the broader system definition and development effort, cybersecurity architectural analysis should help inform engineering tradeoffs and decision making such as those
processes and activities described in ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288.
III. CURRENT CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECTURAL ANALYSIS APPROACHES
In this section, we survey architectural analysis approaches and assess their applicability for complex system cybersecurity. Within the DoD (and its major defense contractors),
several approaches (i.e., methods, processes, and tools) have been developed to secure and
assess the cybersecurity of complex systems and systems-of-systems. While providing a
detailed case study for each approach surveyed in this work would be ideal for a robust
assessment, it is just not feasible as some approaches take months if not years to complete.
This survey is based on publicly available literature and presentations that focus specifically on architectural analysis for weapon systems.
The predecessor for many cybersecurity architectural analysis approaches is compliance-based Information Assurance (IA), which focuses almost exclusively on applying
security controls to computer networks and IT systems. For complex systems, this approach is inadequate as demonstrated by several high profile security breaches [29]. This
inadequacy has driven the development of many of the approaches described in this work.
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A. Department of Defense Architectural Framework (DoDAF)
The integrated architecture currently in use by the DoD is the DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF). Its purpose is to manage complexity to enable key decisions through organized information sharing [23]. However, in DoDAF, like many other architecture frameworks, security (or cybersecurity) is not specifically addressed [30]. James Richards, in his
work Using the Department of Defense Architecture Framework to Develop Security Requirements [28], proposes a methodology for using DoDAF to derive security requirements.
He outlines a process of first building an architectural model of the enterprise, focusing
on a core set of views including the OV-5b operational activity model, the DIV-2 logical
data model, and the OV-3 operational resource flow matrix. These critical views are used
to model security-relevant processes, data, business rules, and communications. Next, he
suggests comparing views for compliance and then assessing and refining the architecture.
The overall purpose of Richards’ approach is to use DoDAF to expose or derive security
requirements [28], This approach has not been widely adopted, but his work demonstrates
utility for complex cyber-physical systems.
B. Unified Architecture Framework (UAF)
In contrast to the unique solution DoDAF, industry has developed the Unified Architecture Framework (UAF) [31]. Based on industry need, the UAF includes a formal security domain amongst the more common architectural views. The UAF security domain
includes views for security taxonomy, structure, connectivity, processes, constraints, and
traceability. More specifically, it uses Systems Modeling Language (SysML) class diagrams
to identify data types and map them to protections and security controls. As an integrated architecture, it allows security-relevant elements to be mapped to system resources
and operations. UAF also capitalizes on the success of model-based sytems engineering
(MBSE) efforts to depict and analyze the security properties of a simulation oriented
language (SoI) via an executable architecture. Note, UAF is in the final stages of development, so its utility has yet to be fully realized; however, some pathfinder examples of
proposed security views demonstrate utility for conducting cybersecurity architectural
analysis of complex cyber-physical systems [32].
C. Publically Available Industry Efforts
Major defense contractors often use custom architectural analysis approaches to design
and evaluate their system architectures concerning cybersecurity. Although it is likely
that most large DoD contractors are working solutions in this area; at the time of this
survey, the authors were only exposed to efforts from Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and
Lockheed Martin. Note, Raytheon’s Cyber Resiliency Architecture Framework (CRAF) was
the only approach with a detailed open-source publication available. Limited information
is available on Northrop and Lockheed’s approaches.
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Raytheon developed CRAF using a DoDAF reference architecture with extensions for
specific cyber resilience mappings and metrics [33]. The goal of CRAF is to assess and identify gaps in cyber resiliency by mapping systems, subsystems, and components against
prioritized capabilities to identify resilience requirements for critical mission scenarios.
Using failure modes and effects analysis, Northrop Grumman created a risk-based assessment methodology using an integrated architecture modeled in the new UAF to identify
cyber risks for their systems [32]. This approach is still under development and is one of
the first systems security efforts based on the upcoming UAF standard security views from
the Object Management Group (OMG).
Lockheed Martin has created a custom solution titled the Secure Engineering Assurance
Model (SEAM) [34]. SEAM is a tailored systems security engineering approach to integrate
security into every solution they deliver. This framework provides tailored security considerations and checklists for each program area.
D. Risk Management Framework (RMF) for Cybersecurity
In response to increasing risks against critical infrastructure and information technology systems, the US government enacted the Federal Information Security Management
Act of 2002 which established minimum information security requirements for federal
information systems, and charged the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) with developing security standards and guidelines to address these growing
risks [35]. In response to this requirement, NIST created the Risk Management Framework
(RMF) which provided a structured yet flexible process for applying these standards and
guidelines [36]. Accordingly, RMF is the mandated approach for addressing cybersecurity
in the DoD [11]. In general, this approach applies a prescriptive risk-based methodology to
cybersecurity with the goal of identifying, mitigating, and eliminating system vulnerabilities to protect systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification,
or destruction. Within the U.S. Air Force, the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center
is tasked with conducting RMF for legacy weapon systems (designated as the Platform
IT (PIT) systems) [37]. This PIT assessment and authorization process consists of six-steps
described in the next paragraph [13].
First, the team must categorize the PIT system according to the information displayed,
processed, stored, and transmitted along with the classification of the information and associated technologies. Second, security controls are selected (or assigned) based on the impact resulting from the loss of said information (i.e., criticality analysis) [12]. The third step
is implementing said controls with consideration for cybersecurity requirements across
the entire system development life cycle—although security controls have been historically
applied to IT systems, many have been tailored for PIT systems with prescribed overlays [37]. The fourth step is key to the RMF process and assesses the effectiveness of applied
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security controls through threat mapping and vulnerability analysis. On a related note,
much of the security work conducted today is exclusively focused on this step. Based on
the identified vulnerabilities, the fifth step is to produce a risk assessment and mitigation
plan, which is then briefed to the Authorization Official for authorization. The sixth step
of the RMF process is continuous monitoring of the system with respect to cybersecurity.
As the system and threat environment evolve, security control effectiveness needs to be
continuously assessed while keeping in mind future changes and cybersecurity impact.
The RMF is the mostly widely implement approach of those surveyed as it is mandatory
for DoD information systems to receive an authorization to operate. While this approach
has mitigated vulnerabilities, many cite its perceived difficulty, steep learning curve, and
IT-centric focus as currently implemented as critiques in its utility for complex cyberphysical systems.
E. Avionics Cyberspace Vulnerability Assessment and Mitigation (ACVAM) and Cyber
Hardening Efforts
The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), in conjunction with the Air Force Institute
of Technology’s (AFIT) Center for Cyberspace Research, developed an Avionics Cyberspace
Vulnerability Assessment and Mitigation (ACVAM) Workshop [38]. This weapon-systemspecific workshop teaches a thorough analysis approach by systematically identifying and
assessing all external inputs and communications paths to and from a weapon system
(i.e., an exhaustive boundary analysis of the system’s architecture). The primary activities
include gathering information, identifying and analyzing access points, finding and analyzing susceptibilities, anticipating attacks, and applying and recommending mitigations
and protections. The ACVAM approach requires extensive subject-matter expert (SME)
involvement, access to design documents, and detailed operator insight to discover susceptibilities and determine appropriate mitigations to increase mission assurance by eliminating or reducing vulnerability to cyberattacks. [39]
Additionally, AFRL is developing enhanced cyber hardening tools and resiliency instructions [40]. While specific details are not publicly available, the cyber hardening approach
was recently briefed to the defense community at large [39]. In general, this approach describes avionics cyber hardening and resiliency concepts and suggests ways to protect
avionics and related systems from cyberattack. Moreover, this approach encourages engineers to ‘think avionics cyber’ using three tenets of cyber protection: focus on what’s critical; restrict access to the critical; and detect, react, and adapt [41]. These approaches provide
a robust analysis but require technically savvy domain experts to execute, which restricts
its utility for a larger group of complex systems.
F. Attack Path Analysis via Automotive Example
Historically, attack path analysis has served the security community well [42]. In a great
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example from the automotive domain, Checkoway et al., provide a practical attack path
analysis and comprehensive discussion which solidifies the importance of threat modeling as a cybersecurity architectural analysis technique [8]. While this specific example is
automobile-centric, many similarities are shared between cyber-physical systems. More
specifically, the work details a four-step method of analyses. First, threat model characterization is accomplished through identification of external attack vectors and attack surfaces. Second, vulnerability analysis addresses the accessibility, criticality, and exploitability
of potential vulnerabilities. Third, a threat assessment attempts to gauge the attacker’s
motivation by answering the question of what utility a given attack path has for the attacker. Finally, the approach suggests mitigation actions by synthesizing similarities among
vulnerabilities to provide practical recommendations for enhancing the system’s cybersecurity.
G. System Theory Process Analysis for Security (STPA-Sec)
In recent work, MIT’s System Theory Process Analysis (STPA) approach for safety was
extended to focus on security related concerns, known as STPA-Sec [43]. The goal of this approach is to ensure mission-critical functions are maintained in the face of disruption(s).
Starting from a strategic viewpoint, system developers and users can proactively shape
the operational environment by controlling specified mission critical system risks. This
top-down approach elevates the security problem from guarding the system (or network)
against all potential attack paths to a higher-level problem of assuring the system’s critical
functions. The STPA-Sec steps include: identifying unacceptable losses, identifying system
hazards (vulnerabilities), drawing the system functional control structure, and identifying
unsafe or insecure CAs [43]. This method has been embraced by defense and commercial
industries with several favorable case studies [43].
H. Functional Mission Analysis for Cyber (FMA-C)
The DoD has adopted Functional Mission Analysis for Cyber (FMA-C) as an approach to
secure operational computer networks [45]. FMA-C is being taught to thousands of airmen to
assure critical cyber systems and reduce vulnerabilities. While the structure and content
of FMA-C are similar to STPA-Sec, its application is tailored to As-Is Information Technology infrastructures. In practice, Air Force Mission Defense Teams apply FMA-C to fielded
cyber systems to identify mission-critical vulnerabilities. It has proved to be a useful tool
for understanding and mitigating risks in traditional cyber (i.e., ICT) domains.
I. Other Notable Methodologies
As previously noted, other methodologies and frameworks for systems-level security
analysis are sure to exist which are not covered in this work. A few notable works focused
on mission assurance are available here [46], [47], [48], and on software here [49], [50].
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IV. D
 ESIRABLE CHARACTERISTICS FOR CONDUCTING CYBERSECURITY
ARCHITECTURAL ANALYSIS
This section identifies desirable characteristics for cybersecurity architectural analysis
and cross-examines the approaches discussed in Section III.
A. Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis Characteristics
The first characteristic is definitional and classifies approaches as either top down or
bottom up. Those defined as top down start with analysis at the function level with identification and examination of critical missions and/or capabilities—sometimes operations
depending on how the approach is being applied. As is typical of architecting for new systems (and sometimes upgrades), higher-level functional analysis leads to further functional decomposition and allocation to a more specific form (e.g., lower subsystems, elements,
or components). These approaches lend themselves to the identification of stakeholder security needs, early trade-offs, thorough security requirements definition, and integration
of more holistic security solutions [27].
Conversely, bottom-up approaches begin with the form in mind (i.e., the physical or
technological solution) and often focus on perimeter security through boundary analysis [51]. While this approach successfully identifies vulnerabilities in networked components, it is often less useful for protecting systems from intelligent adversaries. For example, Bayuk and Horowitz [52] surmise that perimeter defense tactics are mostly ineffective,
and conclude that a top-down, risk-based systems engineering approach to system security
should be used instead.
The next key characteristic is whether the approach should be driven by threats or
vulnerabilities. Prior research suggests that the foundation for improving system security
starts with an analysis of potential threats, which leads to more appropriate security
requirements for implementation [42]. This is intuitive; without first understanding the
adversary—system-specific threats (and their rapid agility)—it is difficult, or impossible, to
defend against them. Understanding and modeling the threat becomes a critical prerequisite for generating and developing secure systems [53]. Once the model has been developed
and validated, vulnerability analysis is the logical follow-on. With the threats understood,
the system architecture can be analyzed for vulnerable access points through techniques
such as attack path analysis and/or red teaming.
While acknowledging the rapidly changing nature of threats, the exercise of red teaming
and brainstorming potential attack paths is a helpful critical thinking exercise for ensuring sound cybersecurity practices. Moreover, threat modeling and vulnerability analysis
typically form the foundation for cybersecurity architectural analysis. While threat modeling alone does not ensure cybersecurity, rigorous threat modeling and vulnerability analysis are helpful for ensuring the security of realized systems. However, more focus should
be applied to providing security solutions and not just focused on identifying problems.
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In today’s highly-contested cyberspace environment, documentation-based engineering
is largely ineffective against dynamic adversaries [42]. Developing a successful response to
a dynamic adversary necessitates the tools and methods used to develop countermeasures
be, in kind, dynamic. In response to these complexities, Model-Based Systems Engineering
(MBSE) offers an integrated modeling approach capable of mapping desired capabilities
to functions (and even components), as well as providing traceability and fit-for-purpose
views to enable more effective decision-making [54]. In a recent effort, Apvrille and Roudier
proposed SysML-Sec, an injection of security considerations into SysML to foster integration between system designers and security experts [55]. SysML-Sec and more generally
MBSE approaches enable security-focused computer simulations of a potential system architecture. These executable architectures provide tremendous value by providing insights
into early design trade-off analysis [56]. While MBSE requires significant initial investment
in tools and training, it significantly increases the depth of possible architectural analysis,
especially in executable architectures.
B. Assesment of Architectural Analysis Approaches
Table I provides a consolidated assessment (i.e., a mapping) of the proposed architectural
analysis characteristics to the surveyed approaches from Section III. This mapping seeks
to provide a consolidated reference for differentiating approaches to inform the user and
assist in selecting an appropriate cybersecurity architectural approach which meets the
stakeholders’ needs. Consideration is given to each approaches’ usability, scalability, and
tool availability. The ideal approach will also easily facilitate modeling and simulation studies to perform early design feasibility studies and support trade-off analysis (i.e., MBSE).
In general, bottom-up approaches are relatively systematic; however, historically they
have not produced secure systems and tended to scale poorly. Top-down approaches have
the benefit of being more scalable, but they often require a high level of tool proficiency
to effectively model (thus, the potential of MBSE to systems security is largely missed).
While vulnerability analysis is inherent in every approach, a threat- based approach is less
so. This aspect is crucial because effectively safeguarding unprecedented, and complex
systems require more than a good architectural tool or technique – a holistic engineering
approach that embraces all aspects of security (e.g., people, processes, policy, technology,
feasibility, cost, etc.) is required [57], [58].
V. C
 ONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The practice of architectural analysis is not new; however, in the context of complex
cyber-physical systems, the role of architectural analysis with respect to cybersecurity is
not well understood. Moreover, given cybersecurity’s widespread interest, it was surprising
to find a general lack of understanding or consistency regarding what it means to conduct
architectural analysis for cybersecurity while surveying the literature. Thus, this work
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Top
Down
DoDAF+
Richards

X1

CRAF

X1

UAF Security

X

ACVAM
STPA-Sec
RMF

Bottom
Up

Threat
Driven

X
X

X

X2

Vul.
Based

MBSE
Integrated

MBSE
Executable

Tool
Based

X

X

X4

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X4

X

X
X

X5

X

X

X3

1. Promotes a top-down approach after mission functions are identified (i.e., does not include mission thread analysis).
2. Approach begins at a higher level than other approaches examined (i.e., includes mission thread analysis) and
includes lower level analysis.
3. Suggests using MBSE, but not required and often not considered.
4. Would require pairing with additional modeling and simulation plugin.
5. RMF is intended to be a top-down approach but is often applied bottom-up using security control compliance
based on system type.
Table 1: Architectural Approaches to Characteristics Mapping

briefly surveys key architectural analysis concepts and provides a timely and widely
applicable working definition of “cybersecurity architectural analysis” for the community
to consider. Next, a survey of several cybersecurity architectural analysis approaches from
industry and government is provided, along with an assessment of their applicability
for complex cyber-physical systems according to several desirable characteristics. These
results help practitioners and researchers understand how to achieve more effective
cybersecurity architectural analysis efforts to develop secure systems according to stakeholders needs.
While there are several promising cybersecurity architectural approaches, each with
unique aspects to be more fully explored, standardized approaches such as UAF paired
with MBSE hold promise and have a wider acceptance than some alternatives. In the near
term, the authors have chosen to explore STPA-Sec to more fully understand its utility as
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a relatively simple architectural analysis approach to assist in the development of safe,
secure, and resilient military systems. Specifically, the authors are executing a detailed
case study for a next-generation aircraft refueling system. This case study focuses on
understanding the utility of the STPA-Sec approach for eliciting cybersecurity and resiliency requirements when developing complex military systems (i.e., unprecedented cyberphysical systems of systems). Ultimately, continued research in this field will enable more
effective and efficient cybersecurity architectural analysis for complex systems regardless
of the application domain.
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